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ABSTRACT 
 
The impact of monitoring mechanisms on financial reporting continues to be a topic of 
debate among academics, regulators and practitioners. This study focuses on whether 
internal and external monitoring mechanisms are related to financial reporting 
credibility. The study seeks to answer the main research question - to what extent are 
board of directors and audit committee characteristics, disclosure of internal control 
weaknesses, audit quality and institutional and bank monitoring associated with financial 
statement credibility. The study also examines whether some control mechanisms 
substitute or complement other control mechanisms. Hence, this study also attempts to 
answer the research question - to what extent board of directors, audit committee 
characteristics and audit quality influence the disclosure of internal control weaknesses. 
This study utilized a pooled sample of Saudi listed companies in the years 2007 and 
2008. Two proxies of earnings informativeness are used to measure the credibility of 
reported earnings, namely (i) volatility of stock returns during the earnings 
announcement period and (ii) announcement period cumulative excess returns. The 
findings support the hypotheses on the association between board independency, audit 
quality, internal control system, and institutional ownership and earnings informativenss. 
The finding fails to support a direct impact of audit committee independence on earnings 
informativeness. However, the result shows that audit committee independence has 
significant impact on the disclosure of internal control system weaknesses and the 
disclosure of internal control system weaknesses has significant impact on earnings 
informativeness. This implies the indirect effects of audit committee independence on 
the credibility of reported earnings, consistent with the explanation that controls are 
complementary. The study extends the limited literature on earnings informativeness in 
Saudi Arabia, and assists the regulators in understanding the effects of monitoring 
mechanisms on the credibility of financial statement. 
 
Keywords: Credibility of Financial Statements, Monitoring Mechanisms, Corporate 
Governance 
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ABSTRAK 
 
Kesan mekanisma pemantauan ke atas pelaporan kewangan terus menjadi topik 
perdebatan di kalangan ahli akademik, penggubal  undang-undang dan praktisioner. 
Kajian ini menjurus kepada persoalan sama ada mekansima pemantauan dalaman dan 
luaran mempengaruhi kredibiliti pelaporan kewangan. Soalan utama yang dikemukakan 
dalam kajian ini adalah sejauh manakah Lembaga Pengarah, Jawatankuasa Audit, 
pendedahan kelemahan dalam kawalan dalaman, kualiti pengauditan, pelabur  institusi 
dan pemantauan pihak bank mempengaruhi kredibiliti penyata kewangan. Kajian ini 
turut mengkaji kemungkinan wujudnya hubungan penggantian atau hubungan saling-
melengkapi di antara beberapa mekanisma kawalan. Oleh itu, kajian ini turut menjawab 
persoalan - sejauh manakah Lembaga Pengarah, Jawatankuasa Audit, dan kualiti 
pengauditan mempengaruhi pendedahan kelemahan dalam sistem kawalan dalaman. 
Kajian ini menggunakan sampel yang terdiri daripada syarikat-syarikat yang tersenarai 
di Bursa Saudi pada tahun 2007 dan 2008. Dua proksi digunakan untuk mencerminkan 
kredibiliti penyata kewangan, iaitu (i) tahap ketidakstabilan pulangan stok ekoran dari 
perolehan yang dilaporkan dan (ii) kesan kumulatif lebihan pulangan stok dalam tempoh 
pengumuman ekoran dari perolehaan yang dilaporkan. Hasil kajian ini menyokong 
hipotesis bahawa kebebasan Lembaga Pengarah, kualiti pengauditan, pendedahan 
kelemahan dalam sistem kawalan dalaman, dan pemilikan saham oleh pelabur institusi 
mempengaruhi kredibiliti penyata kewangan. Hasil kajian ini tidak memaparkan kesan 
langsung yang signifikan di antara kebebasan Jawatankuasa Audit dan kredibiliti 
penyata kewangan. Namun, hasil kajian ini menunjukkan bahawa kebebasan 
Jawatankuasa Audit memberikan kesan signifikan ke atas pendedahan kelemahan dalam 
sistem kawalan dalaman, dan kelemahan sistem kawalan dalaman pula memberi kesan 
signifikan ke atas kredibiliti penyata kewangan. Hasil kajian ini menunjukkan wujudnya 
kesan tidak langsung kebebasan Jawatankuasa Audit ke atas kredibiliti penyata 
kewangan dan selaras dengan pernyataan bahawa kawalan adalah bersifat saling-
melengkapi. Kajian ini menyumbang kepada literatur berkaitan dengan kredibiliti 
penyata kewangan di Saudi yang amat terhad, dan dari segi membantu penggubal selia 
memahami kesan mekanisma pemantauan terhadap kredibiliti penyata kewangan. 
 
Katakunci: Kredibiliti Penyata Kewangan, Mekanisma Pemantauan, Tataurus Korporat 
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CHAPTER ONE 
OVERVIEW 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In today’s modern businesses, investors need useful, accurate and relevant information 
to make better investment decisions. Financial transparency and financial credibility 
have received much attention as a result of financial scandals associated with accounting 
irregularities and other frauds by top management (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, 
and Transmile). These scandals have led most investing communities to request for the 
enhancement of the quality of financial statements since financial statements are the 
main sources of information to investors.  The credibility and transparency of company’s 
financial reports increase the confidence of market participants on the stock exchange, 
and this leads to rise in trading volume and prices of company stock. 
 
Teoh and Wong (1993) and Dey (2005) have used earnings informativeness as a proxy 
of financial reporting credibility. According to Dey (2005), the credibility of financial 
statement and reported earnings is based on investors’ evaluation of reported earnings 
numbers i.e. the extent to which investors perceive those numbers as reflecting the 
current change in shareholder value. According to Lee et al. (2005), when a company’s 
information is incomplete or not considered to be credible, investors will protect 
themselves by requiring a higher expected rate of return (e.g., lowering the price that 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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